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Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data

Prabirjit Sarkar and Ajit Singh
Cambridge Journal of Economics
Vol. 34, No. 2, Special Focus: Globalisation, Institutional Transformation and Equity (March 2010), pp. 325-346
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24231921
Page Count: 22
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Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data
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Abstract

This paper analyses a longitudinal dataset on legal protection of shareholders over a 36 year period, 1970–2005, for four advanced countries, the UK, France, Germany and the USA. It examines two aspects of the legal origin hypothesis—whether shareholder protection is higher in the common law countries (UK and USA) than in the civil law countries (France and Germany) and whether shareholder protection matters for stock market development in the short and long runs. It also examines the 'causation' issue and the 'endogeneity' problem—whether greater shareholder protection leads to stock market development or whether stock market development leads to changes in law. The paper casts serious doubt on the validity of the basic theses of the Anglo Saxon legal and developmental model.

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