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Das türkische Verfassungsgericht auf dem Weg zum „Hüter der Verfassung“

Julia Platter and Barış Çalışkan
Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen
Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), pp. 832-848
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24238587
Page Count: 17
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Das türkische Verfassungsgericht auf dem Weg zum „Hüter der Verfassung“
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Abstract

The Turkish parliamentary system was severely tested during the election of the former foreign minister Abdullah Gül as president of the state in 2007. The opposition parties successfully delayed the election by an application to the Turkish constitutional court based on article 150 of the Turkish constitution. This lawsuit was part of the conflict between the national-kemalistic camp on the one hand and religious-oriented conservative groups on the other. Analyzing article 150 of the Turkish constitution and its procedural conditions and comparing them with procedural rules for the German constitutional court reveals that the Turkish constitutional court interpreted its constitutional authorities as extensive. However, the court has made use of rational and well-known reasons and arguments, which have also been brought up by German constitutional courts in comparable decisions. It is remarkable that in this political crisis, not the armed forces but the court was given the role of an arbitrator. Perhaps, this decision will lead to a new attitude of accepting the constitutional court as a conflict manager between the political forces.

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