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Der Deutsche Bundestag als zentrales Verfassungsorgan nach der neueren Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen
Vol. 43, No. 2 (2012), pp. 313-323
Published by: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24241047
Page Count: 11
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In a series of decisions the Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized that the German Bundestag as the only constitutional body with immediate democratic legitimization in all matters – i.e. on a national, supranational and international level – has to be the central place of debate and decision. The parliament's broad rights and duties extend beyond its function of parliamentary scrutiny and its legislative function. Especially in connection with the European integration process and the monetary union, the Federal Constitutional Court has strengthened the rights of the Bundestag to participate and to decide in terms of an overall directive function. In connection with these rights, the parliament's responsibilities have thus grown broader. The Federal Constitutional Court draws a classical and at the same time a modern picture of the Bundestag as the central constitutional body. However, the Bundestag in its actions and decisions is subject to scrutiny by the Court.
Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen © 2012 Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH