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REPLY TO JULIA DRIVER, TIMM TRIPLETT, AND KATHLEEN WALLACE

BERNARD GERT
Metaphilosophy
Vol. 38, No. 4 (July 2007), pp. 404-419
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439741
Page Count: 16
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REPLY TO JULIA DRIVER, TIMM TRIPLETT, AND KATHLEEN WALLACE
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Abstract

Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.

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