Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

THINKING ABOUT THE GOOD: RECONFIGURING LIBERAL METAPHYSICS (OR NOT) FOR PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

ANITA SILVERS and LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS
Metaphilosophy
Vol. 40, No. 3/4, SPECIAL ISSUE: COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY (July 2009), pp. 475-498
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439797
Page Count: 24
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
THINKING ABOUT THE GOOD: RECONFIGURING LIBERAL METAPHYSICS (OR NOT) FOR PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES
Preview not available

Abstract

Liberalism welcomes diversity in substantive ideas of the good but not in the process whereby these ideas are formed. Ideas of the good acquire weight on the presumption that each is a person's own, formed independently. But people differ in their capacities to conceptualize. Some, appropriately characterized as cerebral, are proficient in and profoundly involved with conceptualizing. Others, labeled cognitively disabled, range from individuals with mild limitations to those so unable to express themselves that we cannot be sure whether their behavior is mediated by concepts at all. Constricted cognitive capacities have been thought to prevent participation in the prescribed process for forming personalized ideas of the good. So liberal theory, when formulating principles and practices of justice, often disregards cognitively disabled peoples' perspectives. We put aside metaphysically driven notions about personhood and show how interpersonal processes of "prosthetic" thinking (different from surrogacy) can satisfy liberalism's standards, positioning cognitively disabled individuals as fully participating subjects of justice.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[475]
    [475]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
476
    476
  • Thumbnail: Page 
477
    477
  • Thumbnail: Page 
478
    478
  • Thumbnail: Page 
479
    479
  • Thumbnail: Page 
480
    480
  • Thumbnail: Page 
481
    481
  • Thumbnail: Page 
482
    482
  • Thumbnail: Page 
483
    483
  • Thumbnail: Page 
484
    484
  • Thumbnail: Page 
485
    485
  • Thumbnail: Page 
486
    486
  • Thumbnail: Page 
487
    487
  • Thumbnail: Page 
488
    488
  • Thumbnail: Page 
489
    489
  • Thumbnail: Page 
490
    490
  • Thumbnail: Page 
491
    491
  • Thumbnail: Page 
492
    492
  • Thumbnail: Page 
493
    493
  • Thumbnail: Page 
494
    494
  • Thumbnail: Page 
495
    495
  • Thumbnail: Page 
496
    496
  • Thumbnail: Page 
497
    497
  • Thumbnail: Page 
498
    498