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Authoritarianism and Participative Budgeting: A Dyadic Analysis

Robert H. Chenhall
The Accounting Review
Vol. 61, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 263-272
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/247257
Page Count: 10
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Authoritarianism and Participative Budgeting: A Dyadic Analysis
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Abstract

Authoritarianism has been the most widely studied personality variable in management accounting research. One important line of research has been the role of authoritarianism as a moderating variable in studies which examine the effectiveness of budgetary participation. Results from these studies have been equivocal. In this paper it is argued that the lack of consensus in this research may be a consequence of examining the personality of only one member of the group involved in the participative process, usually the subordinate. It is claimed that improved understanding of the influence of authoritarianism on subordinate attitudes to the job and budgets can be expected if both subordinate and superior authoritarianism are considered together. The results indicate that budgetary participation is important in its own right and the homogeneous authoritarian dyads are positively associated with subordinate outcomes. Moreover, participation is more strongly associated with subordinate job satisfaction and budgetary attitudes in the homogeneous than in the heterogeneous dyad.

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