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Corporate Governance Within the Context of Antitakeover Provisions

Chamu Sundaramurthy
Strategic Management Journal
Vol. 17, No. 5 (May, 1996), pp. 377-394
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2486701
Page Count: 18
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Corporate Governance Within the Context of Antitakeover Provisions
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Abstract

This paper advances understanding of corporate governance relationships with a longitudinal study of multiple antitakeover options. Prior analyses have been primarily cross-sectional, focused exclusively on a single provision ignoring provisions which require subsequent stockholder approval. The current study uses agency theory, and broadens this perspective by examining the differential impact of institutional investors' stockholding, managerial stock ownership, and corporate board characteristics on the rate of adoption of six provisions, including provisions which do and do not require stockholder approval. Results of hazard analyses of the rate of amendment adoption of 185 firms between 1984 and 1988 indicate that the impact of governance variables on antitakeover provisions differ depending on whether these actions require stockholder approval or not. The pattern of differences indicates that institutional investors use their voting power when they are given an opportunity to vote and that substitution between direct shareholder control and managerial stock ownership exists.

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