Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Snowball Effect Revisited

Kala Krishna
Economic Theory
Vol. 13, No. 2 (Mar., 1999), pp. 377-391
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25055172
Page Count: 15
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Snowball Effect Revisited
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[377]
    [377]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
378
    378
  • Thumbnail: Page 
379
    379
  • Thumbnail: Page 
380
    380
  • Thumbnail: Page 
381
    381
  • Thumbnail: Page 
382
    382
  • Thumbnail: Page 
383
    383
  • Thumbnail: Page 
384
    384
  • Thumbnail: Page 
385
    385
  • Thumbnail: Page 
386
    386
  • Thumbnail: Page 
387
    387
  • Thumbnail: Page 
388
    388
  • Thumbnail: Page 
389
    389
  • Thumbnail: Page 
390
    390
  • Thumbnail: Page 
391
    391