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A Bargaining Approach to the Owen Value and the Nash Solution with Coalition Structure

Juan Vidal-Puga
Economic Theory
Vol. 25, No. 3 (Apr., 2005), pp. 679-701
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25055905
Page Count: 23
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A Bargaining Approach to the Owen Value and the Nash Solution with Coalition Structure
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Abstract

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.

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