Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the Challenger Incident

Patricia H. Werhane
Journal of Business Ethics
Vol. 10, No. 8 (Aug., 1991), pp. 605-616
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25072192
Page Count: 12
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the Challenger Incident
Preview not available

Abstract

The Challenger incident was a result of at least four kinds of difficulties: differing perceptions and priorities of the engineers and management at Thiokol and at NASA, a preoccupation with roles and role responsibilities on the part of engineers and managers, contrasting corporate cultures at Thiokol and its parent, Morton, and a failure both by engineers and by managers to exercise individual moral responsibility. I shall argue that in the Challenger case organizational structure, corporate culture, engineering and managerial habits, and role responsibilites precipitated events contributing to the Challenger disaster. At the same time, a number of individuals at Morton Thiokol and NASA were responsible for the launch failure. Differing world views, conflicting priorities of the engineers and managers on this project, and the failure of either engineers or management to take personal moral responsibility for decision-making contributed significantly to the event.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[605]
    [605]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
606
    606
  • Thumbnail: Page 
607
    607
  • Thumbnail: Page 
608
    608
  • Thumbnail: Page 
609
    609
  • Thumbnail: Page 
610
    610
  • Thumbnail: Page 
611
    611
  • Thumbnail: Page 
612
    612
  • Thumbnail: Page 
613
    613
  • Thumbnail: Page 
614
    614
  • Thumbnail: Page 
615
    615
  • Thumbnail: Page 
616
    616