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Intelligence Estimates of Nuclear Terrorism
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Vol. 607, Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism (Sep., 2006), pp. 87-102
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097841
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Terrorism, Nuclear weapons, Weapons of mass destruction, Weapons, Nuclear terrorism, Atomic bombs, Analytical estimating, United States Senate, Nuclear power, Fissionable materials
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Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States-be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda-has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes and failures, this article's key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real and that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that treat.
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science © 2006 American Academy of Political and Social Science