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Welfare Rights

James Griffin
The Journal of Ethics
Vol. 4, No. 1/2, Rights, Equality, and Liberty Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Law and Philosophy Lectures 1995-1997 (Jan. - Mar., 2000), pp. 27-43
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115634
Page Count: 17
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Welfare Rights
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Abstract

The article tries to qualify the contentious issue of whether there is a human right to welfare. Our notion of human rights is practically without criteria for distinguishing between when it is used correctly and when incorrectly. The first step in any satisfactory resolution of the issue about welfare rights is to supply duly determinate criteria. I then consider the chief reasons for doubting that there is a human right to welfare, in the light of what seem to be, all things considered, the best criteria to attach to the notion of a human right.

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