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Vice and Reason

Terence Irwin
The Journal of Ethics
Vol. 5, No. 1, Ancient Greek Ethics (2001), pp. 73-97
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115679
Page Count: 25
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Vice and Reason
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Abstract

Aristotle's account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Vicious people must be guided by reason, since they act on decision (prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet they cannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention to their non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. We can understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims, once we examine Aristotle's account of (a) the pursuit of the fine and of the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and the pursuit of pleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious person is subject.

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