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Zur Überwindung neuzeitlicher Wissenschaftsauffassungen

Werner Loh
Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Vol. 19, No. 2 (1988), pp. 266-289
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170814
Page Count: 24
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Zur Überwindung neuzeitlicher Wissenschaftsauffassungen
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Abstract

Not 'human sciences', but physics is said to be the measure for that what is called "science". Deficiencies of human sciences are led back to complexity, external influences etc. If one differentiates several orientations for that what is called "science", another reason is determinable. The conceptions of science in modern thinking are monistically orientated, because they have the aim to reach exceptional knowledge, that lets eliminate alternatives. Elimination combined with competition leads to prejudices. Competition does not reduce the irrationality, like Popper, Toulmin and others assumed, but further it. Only a polyistic orientation, for which the aim of science would be the making and maintenance of alternatives, would diminish the causes for prejudices. Since in the 'human sciences' unlike natural sciences prejudices are objects of research this leads to a weakening of the object orientated elimination. What therefore has become an ideal for physics, has fatal consequences for 'human sciences', which a physics orientated philosophy of science consolidates. For that reason a polyistic orientated understanding of science has to be developed, that can be divided in eclectic (pluralistic) and systematic conceptions. As an intensional combinatorics produces systematically alternatives systematic polyism and combinatorics are connected with each other.

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