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Das prädiskursive Einverständnis: Wissenschaftlicher Wahrheitsbegriff und prozedurale Rechtfertigung

Armin Grunwald
Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie
Vol. 29, No. 2 (1998), pp. 205-223
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25171119
Page Count: 19
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Das prädiskursive Einverständnis: Wissenschaftlicher Wahrheitsbegriff und prozedurale Rechtfertigung
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Abstract

The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. - On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a know-how instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated.

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