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Journal Article

Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions

William N. Cooke and Frederick H. Gautschi, III
ILR Review
Vol. 35, No. 4 (Jul., 1982), pp. 539-549
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
DOI: 10.2307/2522666
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2522666
Page Count: 11
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions
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Abstract

Previous research has suggested that U.S. presidents appoint members to the National Labor Relations Board who reflect the administration's own union-management predilections. No adequate empirical evidence has yet been reported, however, to show that, once appointed, Board members act in a biased manner. The present study develops and tests a choice model of Board member decisions in selected unfair labor practice cases over the 195477 period. The evidence strongly supports the popular belief that Board decisions are heavily dependent upon shifting political winds.

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