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Strikes, Arbitration, and Teacher Salaries: A Behavioral Analysis
John Thomas Delaney
Vol. 36, No. 3 (Apr., 1983), pp. 431-446
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2523021
Page Count: 16
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This study uses Bacharach and Lawler's behavioral theory of bargaining to derive hypotheses about the impact of strikes and compulsory interest arbitration on teacher salaries. Those hypotheses are tested with data sets on Illinois and Iowa school districts and on a national sample of teachers drawn from the Current Population Survey. The results suggest that strike use affects teacher salaries but that arbitration use does not. Additional tests indicate that the availability of both arbitration and of the legal or de facto right to strike has similar effects on salary levels, increasing salaries by about 10 percent. The findings also suggest that arbitration and the strike are used as defensive rather than offensive strategies.
ILR Review © 1983 Sage Publications, Inc.