Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained

Arthur J. Robson
International Economic Review
Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 263-274
DOI: 10.2307/2526838
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526838
Page Count: 12
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($39.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper analyzes a simple model of price-setting duopoly in which strategic timing is endogenous. Each firm chooses, in addition to a price, a time at which this price is fixed. Simultaneous moves are permitted, but the only subgame perfect equilibria are more reminiscent of Stackelberg than of Bertrand. For example, if one firm prefers leading and the other prefers following, precisely this pattern results. An asymmetry is uncovered between the case where both prefer to follow and that where both prefer to lead.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
263
    263
  • Thumbnail: Page 
264
    264
  • Thumbnail: Page 
265
    265
  • Thumbnail: Page 
266
    266
  • Thumbnail: Page 
267
    267
  • Thumbnail: Page 
268
    268
  • Thumbnail: Page 
269
    269
  • Thumbnail: Page 
270
    270
  • Thumbnail: Page 
271
    271
  • Thumbnail: Page 
272
    272
  • Thumbnail: Page 
273
    273
  • Thumbnail: Page 
274
    274