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Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained
Arthur J. Robson
International Economic Review
Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 263-274
Published by: Wiley for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526838
Page Count: 12
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This paper analyzes a simple model of price-setting duopoly in which strategic timing is endogenous. Each firm chooses, in addition to a price, a time at which this price is fixed. Simultaneous moves are permitted, but the only subgame perfect equilibria are more reminiscent of Stackelberg than of Bertrand. For example, if one firm prefers leading and the other prefers following, precisely this pattern results. An asymmetry is uncovered between the case where both prefer to follow and that where both prefer to lead.
International Economic Review © 1990 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania