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Choice under Partial Uncertainty

David Kelsey
International Economic Review
Vol. 34, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 297-308
DOI: 10.2307/2526913
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526913
Page Count: 12
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Choice under Partial Uncertainty
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Abstract

This paper analyses problems of choice under uncertainty where a decision-maker does not use subjective probabilities. He has a set of beliefs about which states are more likely than others, but his beliefs cannot be represented as subjective probabilities. Three main kinds of decision rules are possible in this framework. These are maximin-type, maximax-type and choosing that action which gives the highest payoff in the state, which the decision maker believes to be most likely. We replace the commonly used "merger of states" axiom with a version of the sure-thing principle.

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