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Choice under Partial Uncertainty
International Economic Review
Vol. 34, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 297-308
Published by: Wiley for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526913
Page Count: 12
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This paper analyses problems of choice under uncertainty where a decision-maker does not use subjective probabilities. He has a set of beliefs about which states are more likely than others, but his beliefs cannot be represented as subjective probabilities. Three main kinds of decision rules are possible in this framework. These are maximin-type, maximax-type and choosing that action which gives the highest payoff in the state, which the decision maker believes to be most likely. We replace the commonly used "merger of states" axiom with a version of the sure-thing principle.
International Economic Review © 1993 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania