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Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt

Harold L. Cole, James Dow and William B. English
International Economic Review
Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 365-385
DOI: 10.2307/2527201
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527201
Page Count: 21
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt
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Abstract

This paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments. This implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement, but after varying periods of exclusion.

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