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Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment
Kenneth Burdett and Dale T. Mortensen
International Economic Review
Vol. 39, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 257-273
Published by: Wiley for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527292
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Wages, Employment, Unemployment, Productivity, Job hunting, Opportunity costs, Games, Monopsony, Labor markets, Equilibrium wages
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The unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized. Wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed. The unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases: (i) identical workers and employers, (ii) identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices, and (iii) identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities.
International Economic Review © 1998 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania