Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Signalling Reversal

Ram Orzach and Yair Tauman
International Economic Review
Vol. 37, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 453-464
DOI: 10.2307/2527332
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527332
Page Count: 12
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($39.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available

Abstract

The case of a strong contestant who has no direct way to demonstrate its strength and may have to send a costly signal to prove it appears frequently in the signalling literature. We examine what occurs in signalling models with two or more contestants. The receiver of the signal may serve as a credible coordinator who punishes the senders for not collaborating with each other, the result being a separating equilibrium in which the signal sent by the strong contestants, though costly, is also quite rewarding: it increases their payoff level over and above the level attained when their strength is common knowledge.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
453
    453
  • Thumbnail: Page 
454
    454
  • Thumbnail: Page 
455
    455
  • Thumbnail: Page 
456
    456
  • Thumbnail: Page 
457
    457
  • Thumbnail: Page 
458
    458
  • Thumbnail: Page 
459
    459
  • Thumbnail: Page 
460
    460
  • Thumbnail: Page 
461
    461
  • Thumbnail: Page 
462
    462
  • Thumbnail: Page 
463
    463
  • Thumbnail: Page 
464
    464