You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Monopsony and the Lifetime Relation between Wages and Productivity
Yannis M. Ioannides and Christopher A. Pissarides
Journal of Labor Economics
Vol. 3, No. 1, Part 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 91-100
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Society of Labor Economists and the NORC at the University of Chicago
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535051
Page Count: 10
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
We consider the relation between wages and productivity by means of a model based on the following assumptions. Workers live for 2 periods, firms live forever, senior workers differ nontrivially from junior, seniority enhances workers' expected second-period earnings, both firms and workers recognize the prospect of promotion and the senior-junior wage differential at the time of hiring, and firms have monopsony power in hiring junior workers. We show that senior wages are equal to the senior marginal product, but junior wages are set below the junior marginal product by an amount that depends on the elasticity of the firm's labor supply.
Journal of Labor Economics © 1985 The University of Chicago Press