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Review: Is Belief an Internal State?

Reviewed Work: Consciousness and Cognition by Michael Thau
Review by: Frank Jackson
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 132, No. 3 (Feb., 2007), pp. 571-580
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471874
Page Count: 10
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Is Belief an Internal State?
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Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.

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