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Group Intentions as Equilibria
Sara Rachel Chant and Zachary Ernst
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 133, No. 1, Selected Papers from the 2005 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (Mar., 2007), pp. 95-109
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471888
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Collective action, Group mind, Intentionality, Games, Philosophical analysis, Bulletin boards, Philosophical action theory, Evolutionary epistemology, Signals, Evolutionary games
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In this paper, we offer an analysis of 'group intentions.' On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2007 Springer