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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information When Wealth Varies among Individuals

Nuno Garoupa
Economica
New Series, Vol. 65, No. 260 (Nov., 1998), pp. 479-490
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555184
Page Count: 12
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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information When Wealth Varies among Individuals
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Abstract

There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non-optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.

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