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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information When Wealth Varies among Individuals
New Series, Vol. 65, No. 260 (Nov., 1998), pp. 479-490
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science and The Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555184
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Imperfect information, Wealth, Law enforcement, Economic sanctions, Political science, Criminals, Social welfare, Legal defenses, Economic models, Overestimates
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There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non-optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.
Economica © 1998 London School of Economics