You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Learning, Preemption, and the Degree of Rivalry
Chester S. Spatt and Frederic P. Sterbenz
The RAND Journal of Economics
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1985), pp. 84-92
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555590
Page Count: 9
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
We examine a model in which all firms receive common signals as to the uncertain profitability of an investment whose actual payoffs are split only among those who develop the project earliest. The benefit from preempting rivals yields an equilibrium reduction in the amount of learning and earlier development as the number of rivals increases. The set of equilibria shrinks as the number of rivals gets large, and in the limit only the competitive outcome occurs.
The RAND Journal of Economics © 1985 RAND Corporation