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Public Administration and the Separation of Powers in a Cross-Atlantic Perspective

Mark R. Rutgers
Administrative Theory & Praxis
Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 287-308
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25611434
Page Count: 22
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Public Administration and the Separation of Powers in a Cross-Atlantic Perspective
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Abstract

This article focuses on the links between the doctrine of the separation of powers and the concept of public administration in a cross-Atlantic perspective. The separations doctrine is at the root of the concept of public administration as it emerged in the nineteenth century. It is a troublesome starting point, as it remains unclear how administration relates to the other state functions. What is more, the doctrine proofs not to have a univocal interpretation in Western thought. As a consequence, the conceptualization of public administration and thus what constitutes an administrative phenomenon differs. To account for the theoretical, normative as well as practical meaning of our core concepts is a prerequisite for furthering international discourse in the field.

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