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Group Decision Making under Threat: The Tycoon Game
Deborah L. Gladstein and Nora P. Reilly
The Academy of Management Journal
Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 613-627
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/256117
Page Count: 15
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The relationship between external threat and group decision-making processes was tested with 24 groups involved in a management simulation called Tycoon. Results indicate a restriction in information processing and increased stress when threat is increased, although there was no change in the centralization of influence within the groups. The findings show partial support for the threat-rigidity hypothesis and provide evidence for the usefulness of management simulations as a research methodology.
The Academy of Management Journal © 1985 Academy of Management