If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Bubbles and Crises

Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale
The Economic Journal
Vol. 110, No. 460 (Jan., 2000), pp. 236-255
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Economic Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2565656
Page Count: 20
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Bubbles and Crises
Preview not available

Abstract

In recent financial crises a bubble, in which asset prices rise, is followed by a collapse and widespread default. Bubbles are caused by agency relationships in the banking sector. Investors use money borrowed from banks to invest in risky assets, which are relatively attractive because investors can avoid losses in low payoff states by defaulting on the loan. This risk shifting leads investors to bid up the asset prices. Risk can originate in both the real and financial sectors. Financial fragility occurs when positive credit expansion is insufficient to prevent a crisis.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
236
    236
  • Thumbnail: Page 
237
    237
  • Thumbnail: Page 
238
    238
  • Thumbnail: Page 
239
    239
  • Thumbnail: Page 
240
    240
  • Thumbnail: Page 
241
    241
  • Thumbnail: Page 
242
    242
  • Thumbnail: Page 
243
    243
  • Thumbnail: Page 
244
    244
  • Thumbnail: Page 
245
    245
  • Thumbnail: Page 
246
    246
  • Thumbnail: Page 
247
    247
  • Thumbnail: Page 
248
    248
  • Thumbnail: Page 
249
    249
  • Thumbnail: Page 
250
    250
  • Thumbnail: Page 
251
    251
  • Thumbnail: Page 
252
    252
  • Thumbnail: Page 
253
    253
  • Thumbnail: Page 
254
    254
  • Thumbnail: Page 
255
    255