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CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance

Henry L. Tosi, Jr. and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
The Academy of Management Journal
Vol. 37, No. 4 (Aug., 1994), pp. 1002-1016
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/256609
Page Count: 15
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CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance
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Abstract

This study used a behavioral scale assessing the monitoring of the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) to test two hypotheses derived from agency theory and the corporate governance literature. Results were consistent with the hypotheses, showing that CEO compensation monitoring is related asymptotically to firm performance and that the relationship between monitoring and performance is stronger in management-controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms.

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