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Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events
Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 94, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 627-640
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585835
Page Count: 14
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We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strom's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strom model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.
The American Political Science Review © 2000 American Political Science Association