You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting
Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 92, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 23-35
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585926
Page Count: 13
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Defendants, Jurors, Juries, Legal innocence, Signals, Guilty verdicts, Voting, Verdicts, Guilt, Voting paradox
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors undermines this basic intuition. We show that the unanimity rule may lead to a high probability of both kinds of error and that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury. Finally, we demonstrate that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.
The American Political Science Review © 1998 American Political Science Association