You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election
R. Michael Alvarez, Jonathan Nagler and Shaun Bowler
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 94, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 131-149
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586385
Page Count: 19
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Voting, Political science, Economic inflation, Conservatism, Political parties, Economic models, Unemployment, Political elections, Taxes, Simulations
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
We offer a model of multiparty elections that combines voters' retrospective economic evaluations with consideration of parties' issue positions and the issue preferences of voters. We show that both policy issues and the state of the economy matter in British elections. In 1987 voters made a largely retrospective evaluation of the Conservatives based on economic performance; those who rejected the Conservative Party chose between Labour and Alliance based on issue positions. Through simulations we move the parties in the issue space and reestimate vote shares as well as hypothesize an alternative distribution of views on the economy, and we show that Labour had virtually no chance to win with a centrist party as a viable alternative. The predictions from our 1987 simulations are supported in an analysis of the 1992 British election. We argue for multinomial probit in studying three-party elections because it allows for a richer formulation of politics than do competing methods.
The American Political Science Review © 2000 American Political Science Association