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The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan
C. C. S. Newton
The Economic History Review
New Series, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 391-408
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2597288
Page Count: 18
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Convertibility, Economic aid, Countries, International economics, Economics, Drains, Hard currency, International economic cooperation, Creditors, Economic recovery
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Using recently released British Government documents, the article maintains that the postwar Labour gov-ernment's approach to European integration was underpinned by fundamental considerations of economic policy. The 1947 sterling crisis revealed a basic connexion between the viability of the sterling area and the health of the domestic economy. The Marshall Plan, attempting to restore multilateralism through the creation of an integrated Europe under British leadership, posed a threat to the viability of the sterling area. Thus Britain worked for inter-governmental European co-operation and argued that global economic expansion led by the United States would be the most effective way of restoring multilateralism
The Economic History Review © 1984 Economic History Society