You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy
The RAND Journal of Economics
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 488-501
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600997
Page Count: 14
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
I analyze the optimal degree of forward patent protection in a two-stage patent race framework. I compare three patent regimes, as the second innovation may be unpatentable and infringing (UI), patentable and infringing (PI), or patentable and not infringing (PN). Forward protection is highest in regime UI and lowest in regime PN. I identify a fundamental inefficiency affecting regime UI, namely that it always leads to underinvestment in the second innovation, and I note various determinants of the welfare ranking of the regimes. Specifically, strong forward protection becomes less attractive as the relative profitability of the first innovation increases and the relative difficulty of obtaining it decreases.
The RAND Journal of Economics © 2000 RAND Corporation