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A Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of PAC and Constituency Effects on Access
Michelle L. Chin, Jon R. Bond and Nehemia Geva
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 62, No. 2 (May, 2000), pp. 534-549
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647686
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Political action committees, Constituents, Political science, Meetings, Scheduling, Lobbying, Experimentation, Campaign contributions, Sample mean, Political campaigns
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A between-groups experimental design tests the hypothesis that PACs have an advantage over constituents in gaining access to members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Sixty-nine congressional staffers participated in an exercise designed to simulate the process by which scheduling decisions are made. The study was conducted in Washington, DC, in the fall of 1996. Analysis of variance reveals a significant constituency main effect, but no significant PAC main effect. That is, requests associated with a PAC are not significantly more likely to be granted access than those not associated with a PAC, whereas requests from constituents do have a significant advantage in gaining access.
The Journal of Politics © 2000 The University of Chicago Press