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The Democratic Peace and Rivalries
Paul R. Hensel, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 62, No. 4 (Nov., 2000), pp. 1173-1188
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647871
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Rivalry, Democracy, Dyadic relations, Peacetime, Regime change, Dyadics, War, Interstate conflict, Conflict resolution, Political science
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This article reexamines the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion. We extend the democratic peace proposition beyond isolated militarized disputes or wars to longer term interstate rivalries. Rivalries of all types are rare among democratic dyads; there is only one case of enduring rivalry between consistently democratic states, and most conflictual relationships between democracies remain confined to isolated conflict. Second, we assess the effect of regime change on rivalry behavior when a regime change precipitates or ends a jointly democratic dyad. Enduring rivalries that include both joint democratic and nondemocratic periods exhibit significantly lower dispute propensities while both rivals are democratic, although proto-rivalries show much smaller differences. Importantly, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to strengthen over time after the transition to joint democracy, which is consistent with the onset and deepening of democratic norms. Both proto- and enduring rivalries show a decreasing propensity for militarized conflict within a year of the transition to joint democracy, and this propensity decreases almost to zero within five years. Our results generally confirm and extend the robust effects of the democratic peace.
The Journal of Politics © 2000 The University of Chicago Press