If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds

Frances E. Lee
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 34-62
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2648000
Page Count: 29
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds
Preview not available

Abstract

Political scientists have long believed that the formal arrangements of representative institutions make a difference for public policy; in spite of this, they have largely neglected to investigate the policy effects of Senate apportionment This paper tests the hypothesis that coalition building in the Senate will produce distributions of federal funds to states reflecting the enhanced representation of small states in the Senate Using Bickers and Stein's U. S. Domestic Assistance Programs Database, I find that, first, federal distributive programs are typically constructed so that a majority, frequently an overwhelming majority, of states benefit Second, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series design (N = 350), I examine the distributions of federal funds to states in different types of domestic assistance programs to determine if they bear the imprint of Senate apportionment I find that over-represented states tend to receive higher allocations of federal funds per capita, most notably in programs characterized as nondiscretionary distributive.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[34]
    [34]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
35
    35
  • Thumbnail: Page 
36
    36
  • Thumbnail: Page 
37
    37
  • Thumbnail: Page 
38
    38
  • Thumbnail: Page 
39
    39
  • Thumbnail: Page 
40
    40
  • Thumbnail: Page 
41
    41
  • Thumbnail: Page 
42
    42
  • Thumbnail: Page 
43
    43
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51
  • Thumbnail: Page 
52
    52
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[53]
    [53]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[54]
    [54]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[55]
    [55]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
56
    56
  • Thumbnail: Page 
57
    57
  • Thumbnail: Page 
58
    58
  • Thumbnail: Page 
59
    59
  • Thumbnail: Page 
60
    60
  • Thumbnail: Page 
61
    61
  • Thumbnail: Page 
62
    62