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The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta
Thomas M. Crisp and Ted A. Warfield
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jul., 2000), pp. 173-184
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653408
Page Count: 12
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Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of the Consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence argument's central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2000 International Phenomenological Society