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Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity
Michael C. Rea and David Silver
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jul., 2000), pp. 185-193
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653409
Page Count: 9
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In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks's argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks's argument is valid.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2000 International Phenomenological Society