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What Am I?

Lynne Rudder Baker
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 59, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 151-159
DOI: 10.2307/2653462
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653462
Page Count: 9
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
What Am I?
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Abstract

Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable-namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call `the Constitution View.' Finally, Olson's own "Biological View of personal identity" has liabilities of its own.

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