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Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 62, No. 2 (Mar., 2001), pp. 407-419
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653705
Page Count: 13
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We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 2001 International Phenomenological Society