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Lewis on Finkish Dispositions

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 703-710
DOI: 10.2307/2653790
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653790
Page Count: 8
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Lewis on Finkish Dispositions
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Abstract

Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.

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