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Lewis on Finkish Dispositions
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 703-710
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653790
Page Count: 8
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Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis's account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 1999 International Phenomenological Society