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"Yes" and "No"

Ian Rumfitt
Mind
Vol. 109, No. 436 (Oct., 2000), pp. 781-823
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660026
Page Count: 43
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"Yes" and "No"
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Abstract

In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if the answer "No" is accorded parity with the answer "Yes".

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