Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

"Yes" and "No"

Ian Rumfitt
Mind
Vol. 109, No. 436 (Oct., 2000), pp. 781-823
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660026
Page Count: 43
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
"Yes" and "No"
Preview not available

Abstract

In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if the answer "No" is accorded parity with the answer "Yes".

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[781]
    [781]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
782
    782
  • Thumbnail: Page 
783
    783
  • Thumbnail: Page 
784
    784
  • Thumbnail: Page 
785
    785
  • Thumbnail: Page 
786
    786
  • Thumbnail: Page 
787
    787
  • Thumbnail: Page 
788
    788
  • Thumbnail: Page 
789
    789
  • Thumbnail: Page 
790
    790
  • Thumbnail: Page 
791
    791
  • Thumbnail: Page 
792
    792
  • Thumbnail: Page 
793
    793
  • Thumbnail: Page 
794
    794
  • Thumbnail: Page 
795
    795
  • Thumbnail: Page 
796
    796
  • Thumbnail: Page 
797
    797
  • Thumbnail: Page 
798
    798
  • Thumbnail: Page 
799
    799
  • Thumbnail: Page 
800
    800
  • Thumbnail: Page 
801
    801
  • Thumbnail: Page 
802
    802
  • Thumbnail: Page 
803
    803
  • Thumbnail: Page 
804
    804
  • Thumbnail: Page 
805
    805
  • Thumbnail: Page 
806
    806
  • Thumbnail: Page 
807
    807
  • Thumbnail: Page 
808
    808
  • Thumbnail: Page 
809
    809
  • Thumbnail: Page 
810
    810
  • Thumbnail: Page 
811
    811
  • Thumbnail: Page 
812
    812
  • Thumbnail: Page 
813
    813
  • Thumbnail: Page 
814
    814
  • Thumbnail: Page 
815
    815
  • Thumbnail: Page 
816
    816
  • Thumbnail: Page 
817
    817
  • Thumbnail: Page 
818
    818
  • Thumbnail: Page 
819
    819
  • Thumbnail: Page 
820
    820
  • Thumbnail: Page 
821
    821
  • Thumbnail: Page 
822
    822
  • Thumbnail: Page 
823
    823