You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Bargaining and War
R. Harrison Wagner
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 44, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 469-484
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669259
Page Count: 16
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
Nearly all wars end not because the states that are fighting are incapable of further fighting but because they agree to stop. Thus to explain why wars occur one must explain why states must fight before reaching agreement, which implies that war must be considered part of the bargaining process that leads to a negotiated settlement and not as an alternative to it. However, most attempts to explain the occurrence of war assume that it is entirely the result of a choice made before it begins. I show that this way of posing the problem can only lead to misleading conclusions by analyzing a model in which a negotiated settlement remains possible after war starts.
American Journal of Political Science © 2000 Midwest Political Science Association