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Bank Ownership and Efficiency

Yener Altunbas, Lynne Evans and Philip Molyneux
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Vol. 33, No. 4 (Nov., 2001), pp. 926-954
DOI: 10.2307/2673929
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2673929
Page Count: 29
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Bank Ownership and Efficiency
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Abstract

Agency issues associated with different types of firm ownership are an area of concern in many banking systems where state-owned banks operate alongside mutual and private-sector institutions. This paper uses a variety of approaches to model cost and profit inefficiencies as well as technical change for different ownership types in the German banking market. We find little evidence to suggest that privately owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public-sector counterparts. While all three bank ownership types benefit from widespread economies of scale, inefficiency measures indicate that public and mutual banks have slight cost and profit advantages over their private sector competitors.

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