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Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring

Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg
The American Economic Review
Vol. 91, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 2001), pp. 426-430
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677802
Page Count: 5
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Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
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