Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Garrett Cullity
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 2, No. 3, Ethics: Meta, Normative and Applied (Sep., 1999), pp. 277-294
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504095
Page Count: 18
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant
Preview not available

Abstract

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This 'virtue ethical' claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[277]
    [277]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
278
    278
  • Thumbnail: Page 
279
    279
  • Thumbnail: Page 
280
    280
  • Thumbnail: Page 
281
    281
  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284
  • Thumbnail: Page 
285
    285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
286
    286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
287
    287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
288
    288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
289
    289
  • Thumbnail: Page 
290
    290
  • Thumbnail: Page 
291
    291
  • Thumbnail: Page 
292
    292
  • Thumbnail: Page 
293
    293
  • Thumbnail: Page 
294
    294