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Higher and Lower Pleasures: Doubts on Justification
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 415-429
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504252
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Pleasure, Reasoning, Sorites, Paradoxes, Utilitarianism, Inference, Expected utility, Morality, Hedonism, Mills ratio
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According to the discontinuity view we can have a (lower) pleasure which, no matter how often a certain unit of it is added to itself, cannot become greater in value than a unit of another (higher) pleasure. All recent adherents of this view seem to rely basically on the same sort of reasoning which is referred to here as 'the preference test'. This article presents three arguments, each of which indicates that the inference from the preference test to the discontinuity view is not conclusive.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice © 2002 Springer